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Abstract
This paper analyses the rationale for restricting the international trade in art, namely
protection of the national artistic patrimony.  The meaning of national patrimony is analysed
and rationales for state ownership and interventions in the art market analysed in light of the
non-private benefits that this category of art produces.  Distributional concerns in the
international movement of art are considered along with the 'endowment effect' that can arise
when dealing with potential transactions of patrimony art.  Finally the paper provides a
taxonomy of restrictions used to prevent art objects leaving a nation namely export
restrictions, import regulations, and tax policies and incentives.1
I    Why Protect The National Patrimony?
Introduction: What is the National Patrimony?
The notion of the existence of a national artistic patrimony that is jeopardised if part of it
is sold, especially for export abroad, is one of the most pervasive themes in debates
surrounding trade in art.  Virtually every state has adopted specific legislation dedicated to
the purpose of protecting cultural objects in recognition of the public interest in safeguarding
what is seen as part of a nation’s heritage.  What though belongs to the national patrimony,
what is the case for the state either purchasing and/or preventing the sale of objects belonging
to the national patrimony, and what are the means by which it can attempt to bring this
about?  These questions are the subject matter of this paper.
In attempting to answer the question of what belongs to the national artistic patrimony, it
is helpful to think of the different types of arts output.  For the purposes of this discussion, it
is possible to categorise arts output into three broad types.  Schulze (1998) talks of the live
performing arts (e.g. concerts, theatre), reproducible art (e.g. films, CDs, books), and unique
or non-reproducible art (e.g. paintings, sculpture and other artefacts).  The three differ
substantially from each other in three important respects; durability, production technology
and associated degree of uniqueness.  The performing arts are largely ‘art services’ and are
therefore non-storable; their preservation therefore is not an issue in this sense.  Reproducible
art can be seen as a commodity in many respects like any other – once initially produced it is
storable, easy and cheap to reproduce and relatively freely traded.  The focus of this chapter
is on unique or non-reproducible art, namely paintings, sculpture and other art/historic
artefacts.
Paintings and sculpture are unique – each original work is distinctive or a ‘one-off’ even if
it is copied or produced in the ‘style’ of another artist.  In economic terms this means that
there are no close substitutes for the goods.  This uniqueness, coupled with high relative
durability, makes these works ‘collectors’ items’, for which there is a strong secondary
market.  Schulze (1998) points out that this is a highly distinctive feature of this form of art.
Although there is a primary market where artists (producers) sell directly to ‘first’ consumers,
the bulk of trading is on secondary markets between consumers and consumers.  These
features make the market for paintings and sculpture very different to those of other2
commodities and hence the application of standard economic theory, and particularly trade
theory, is of limited relevance.
Not all unique art of course belongs to the national patrimony.  In most countries there is
an ‘age’ requirement, say objects of 50 years standing or more (see later).  Not all ‘old’ art
belongs to the national patrimony either; only art that fulfils some important function is
categorised as belonging to it (see later).  Thus, what belongs to the national patrimony is
subjective and varies considerably from country to country.  Central to the definition though
is that objects belonging to the national patrimony are of long standing and contribute in an
integral way to the cultural identity/tradition of a country/region.  As one author puts it
(Galle, 1991, p. 9), the national artistic heritage or national patrimony consists of:
Objects and forms of artistic expression which the... state concerned designates as objects
of cultural interest, which contribute or have contributed to the present identity of a
people or group in any way whatsoever and which are characteristic of them.
However the national patrimony is defined, it can usefully be categorised into two types:
moveable (paintings and single pieces of sculpture) and immovable art  (collective sites,
buildings, monuments and their attachments).  While this article will concentrate on the
former, there is a certain degree of overlap often caused by looting, pillaging and even ‘legal’
trade which involves the breaking up of collective sites/monuments and leads to a
considerable blurring of the boundaries between moveable and immovable art (see Prott and
O’Keefe, 1989).
One further point to keep in mind is the issue of where the national patrimony is
physically located.  A major part of it is in public ownership and is housed in public museums,
public institutions or publicly-owned sites.  Some is in private hands, such as private galleries
or homes, some is in churches, and finally some cannot be classified into any of these
categories (e.g. objects not yet uncovered, objects on sites where ownership is not legally
clear).
A critical issue in relation to the national patrimony is the stealing and looting of part of
it, especially where access is ‘open’ and protection is difficult to enforce.  Many international
agreements address this issue, but it is a problem that has existed for thousands of years.  The
looting of works of art by invading armies, or colonisers, has been a recurring theme and is
topical today with many claims arising recently from activities during the period around the
Second World War.
1  What is different perhaps now is the scale of activity of privately-
organised thieves/looters.  In addition to the issue ownership is that of the3
preservation/conservation, as opposed to the ownership, of the national patrimony.  These all
raise interesting issues but are not the concern of this article.
The focus here is on: (i) who should own the national patrimony, and especially what is
the role for the state in this regard; and (ii) as a corollary what restrictions can the state
impose on the sale of objects listed as belonging to the national patrimony but held by private
individuals?
II   State Ownership/Intervention and Non-private Benefits associated with National
Patrimony
A: Introduction
Much of the national patrimony that is in state ownership came from what were once the
private collections of wealthy royals, especially in Europe.  Many of these works of art had
de facto been paid for by public money.  Likewise in the United States, much of what is in
state collections came from donations by private individuals, aided by tax expenditures by the
state (see O’Hagan, 1998).  These objects are thus in state ownership/museums not arising
from any philosophical view and/or economic rationale, but simply one could say by historical
‘accident’.  As no-one has mentioned selling any of these national treasures, no matter how
acquired, the issue of their sale will not be discussed until later, even though their
maintenance and upkeep does involve the state in continuing expenditure.
What is of interest is why the state should purchase today, or aid the purchase of, an
historical artefact that comes on the open market and/or restrict the sale of such an artefact
outside the boundaries of the nation state?  This is the issue to be addressed in this section.  It
might be said that the decision whether or not to sell objects already in public ownership is
just the mirror image of this question, but as shall be seen later there is an extraordinary
reluctance to sell art objects, either new or old, not only from public collections of art but
also private art museums.
The main rationale provided by economists for state ownership of things such as historical
works of art is that the benefits from the existence of such objects are not just private but also
non-private in nature.  The essence of this argument is that objects identified as belonging to
the national patrimony create a benefit not just for those who view these objects, for which
they can be charged, but also a benefit that accrues to everyone, both those who do and those
who do not view.  This benefit, the non-private benefit, cannot be charged individually to
people but must be paid for, and in this particular case, the objects owned by the state and
funded out of general taxation.
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This in principle is a powerful argument for public ownership of the national patrimony,
based as it is on strict economic reasoning rather than on some rhetorical special pleading.  It4
is stating that there are objects the very existence of which does create a benefit, be it psychic
or whatever, for most of the population.  It would be almost impossible to charge people
according to the benefit they derive, and as such the object should be paid for collectively by
the state using the device of compulsory taxation.  What though are these non-private
benefits associated with the existence of certain historical artefacts?  And, even if they exist,
what is their magnitude, in other words how much public money should be allocated to the
purchase and/or protection of these artefacts?  The latter question is almost impossible to
answer and must remain a matter for conjecture or be determined in the political market place
(as is most often the case).  What the non-private benefits might be is an easier question
altogether to answer.  A wide variety of such benefits has been identified and inevitably there
is more substance to some claims than to others.  For the purposes of this article, though, two
groupings will be considered: (i) development of national/regional identity and social
cohesion and (ii) an assortment of other less important non-private benefits.
B: National/regional  Identity and Social Cohesion
One of the arguments used most frequently in relation to the protection of the national art
heritage relates to national identity, i.e. the extent to which this heritage can define ‘those
elements of national life which characterise a country and distinguish its attitudes, institutions,
behaviour, way of life from those of other countries’ (Throsby and Withers, 1979, p. 177).
Like the physical well-being of its people and lands, the cultural identity of a nation must be
cherished and protected, according to this argument.  The protection both of the physical and
cultural well-being, that is the physical and cultural capital, of a country, region or city
creates benefits for all and these are best paid for collectively and usually owned by the state.
This argument though has been subjected to rather searching analysis by Globerman
(1983).  What is national identity and how does the culture of a country contribute to the
establishment of such an identity?  As Globerman states:
In the absence of a specification of how culture produces national identity and a more
defensible nation, it is quite plausible to argue that there may be much less costly ways to
accomplish the objective... Indeed, it is possible to argue that virtually no effective
relationship exists between indigenous culture and national identity.  For example, some
critics suggest that art, by its very nature, is international in character, or that art should
be judged for its own sake and not for the sake of cultural, social or economic purposes
(pp. 41-42).5
Indeed, some argue that art assists in eliminating parochialism and ignorance if it is allowed
to circulate freely and not be in state ownership in the country in which it originated.  ‘If
parochialism is a sickness, a free trade in artistic and cultural treasures is part of the cure’
(Merryman, 1974, p. 238).
The above raises the issue of why art belonging to the national patrimony should even be
kept in the country in question.  In a similar vein, Bator (1989) points out that as nations
become more internally homogeneous, trading artefacts is a mean by which immigrant
populations and ethnic groups can maintain contact with the art and culture of their mother
country.  A somewhat  different point is that foreign buyers may appreciate a work of art
long before it is given any recognition at home and that this often acts as an external stimulus
in the revaluation of a nation’s own art and culture (see Prott and O’Keefe, 1989).   What
better advertisement for those who want to protect and conserve some national
monuments/sculptures than to see part of these exhibited in say the Metropolitan Museum in
New York to huge public acclaim?
The national identity argument though is used pervasively, nowhere more than in relation
to restricting the export of historical works of art.  But, as Zolberg (1996) argues in
connection with this debate, in the late twentieth century the very notion of national identity
is suspect.
In the context of large, heterogeneous nation-states should we speak of multiple identities
or a single one?  Is it valid to speak of “national” identity as if all nations were the same?
Is national identity a fixed entity or a changing one?  These questions recall debates about
the concept of “national character”, long discredited, in part because of its ingrained
stereotypical assumptions  (pp. 166-167).
In the past, national identity has usually been ascribed to a population co-extensive with the
geographic boundaries of a nation, and most European countries would consider themselves
to have a distinct national identity, with the national patrimony making a significant
contribution to this.  Many European countries are not monocultural, though, but, with
immigration over the last century, multicultural, France and Britain being good examples.
The real danger of an emphasis on national identity and a common cultural heritage could be
the exclusion of these ‘foreigners’ from the national cultural debate, as well as a resistance to
change over time.  The United States of course is the quintessential nation of immigrants.  As
such, people there have had to face for a long time the issue of what ‘American identity’
means.  The issue has never been resolved, and as such one hears far less emphasis on this6
argument for cultural support in the United States than would be the case in most European
countries.  In fact, some people would see an emphasis on national identity as  divisive.
The national identity, and related national prestige (see later), argument though holds
tremendous appeal for most people, even for Americans; witness the reactions of the
population there to US participation in for example the Olympic Games or the Ryder Cup in
golf.  Even if it is accepted that national or regional identity is desired by the body politic,
there still remains the question of the link between the national patrimony and national
identity.  Drawing on the work of sociologists, Globerman suggests that the benefit of
national identity is synonymous with social cohesion and harmony (which benefits everyone),
that this cohesion in turn depends on the intensity of social communications within and
among groups, and that members of the same nation communicate more effectively with each
other and over a wider range of subjects than with outsiders.  Thus it is argued that national
cohesion depends on the degree of communication intensity, and the latter in turns depends in
part on the extent of government protection of the national patrimony.  If preserving the
national patrimony helps us to understand who we are and to understand the ways of living
and the problems of our fellow citizens then the benefits are public in nature and the assets
should be protected by, and probably owned by, the state.  This is captured neatly in the
following:
The art of a society is both a manifestation and mirror of its culture and the existence and
awareness of a common culture is intimately tied to the existence and awareness of a
sense of community.  (Bator, 1981, p.117)
Thus national identity and social cohesion are linked and this connection is argued also by
Weil (1991).  He asserts in fact that one of the primary functions of the arts is to act as an
agent of social cohesion and continuity.
Like language, the arts are one of the principal means by which a society binds itself
together and transmits its beliefs and standards from one generation to another.  The arts
perform this function when they embody, reinforce, and celebrate the values of their
society, when they confirm and exemplify the lessons simultaneously taught by the family,
by the formal structures of education, and by the various mass media in all their variety.  In
this function, the arts play a critically important role.  Not only do they provide a kind of
social “glue”, but they also furnish a means by which society can identify and distinguish
itself from others. (Weil, 1991, p. 156)7
This is indeed a very strong assertion; it may apply with special force to less well-off nations.
Removing antiquities from the culture in which it is embedded (e.g. Mayan art) may deprive
communities from enjoying its benefits and may threaten their sense of identity, alienate them
from traditional sources of authority and weaken their institutional frameworks.  The loss of
such traditional art may happen insidiously and gradually over many years or in extreme
cases, for example in war time or colonial exploitation, there may be sudden and excessive
movement.  Prott and O’Keefe (1989) also point out the problem especially with tribal and
traditional communities, that western collectors through buying and reselling certain art
works transform objects that may have been intended for religious worship or even some
functional use into materialistic consumer goods.
 3  A related problem with the movement of
certain works of art is that it may destroy important records of history or even civilisations, as
seen in excessive depletion, be it through looting or whatever means, of the Mayan sites.  If
an antiquity is left within its intended site or culture, historians and scholars can often learn
much more about the artists, their techniques and generally about the culture and tradition
that followed, whereas once moved there may be much less chance to acquire such
information when researched out of context.
This last argument is suggestive of the fact that the collective benefits involved may apply
to a much wider group than the indigenous population.  Sites containing immovable art may
throw light on the origins of mankind in general and thus in a fundamental way contribute to
the world population’s identity.  There is though no corresponding ‘world government’ to
fund the purchase/upkeep of such sites, but there are international bodies that can be used for
the transfer of relatively small sums of international money to such projects.  Besides, it may
strengthen the resolve of some countries to assist the originating country in protecting its
national patrimony against unlawful removal (see later) if all countries benefit from so doing.
National/regional identity then is a persuasive and indeed pervasive argument in favour of
state ownership/regulation of objects deemed to belong to the national artistic patrimony.  It
is an argument in itself and it also has a bearing on almost all other arguments for such
ownership/regulation.
C : Other Non-private Benefits
National Prestige
International recognition and prestige are often posited as a benefit of protecting the national
artistic patrimony that is related to social cohesion and national identity, and like these is
public in nature.  Few people, it is argued, would be happy if their country ‘became known8
abroad as a cultural wasteland, a nation in which Mammon had put beauty and art to rout’
(Baumol and Bowen, 1966, p. 383).  Baumol and Bowen went on to cite the billions of
dollars that the United States government had spent on getting first to the moon, much of
which expenditure was justified solely in terms of national feeling of achievement.  Bator
(1981) argues that art is a ‘good ambassador’ in that the trade and movement of art between
nations helps to stimulate interest, understanding and admiration of the originating nation.  As
such, there is a national interest in having a collection of valuable historical art as it ensures
the country a place in the international art and culture arena as well as being perhaps a major
‘magnet’ for attracting tourists (see later).
National prestige though is a very dubious grounds on which to base a public
ownership/regulation argument.  First, many more people might be concerned about the
international standing of their football team or their golf players or film or car industry than
that of their arts sector. It could be, though, that professional football or tennis will exist
perfectly well without any subsidy, and therefore generate a positive benefit for others
anyway, whereas the art-historical sector may not be able to sustain itself (at levels that
generate national prestige) commercially without subsidy, and hence, in the absence of
subsidy, no positive non-private benefit will be forthcoming.  Besides, as will be seen later,
many people do not think it appropriate to equate golf or basketball stars with historical art
objects; the existence of both creates a sense of national pride, but basketball teams can be
resurrected if let ‘die’ and golf stars come and go.  Antiquities are unique, irreplaceable and
perhaps relate much more to the ‘spirit’ and essence of a nation than do other factors.  This
brings the discussion back to national identity; there is not simply international prestige in
having art objects on show for visitors, but in this case these objects also provide these
visitors with a sense of the origin and identity of the nation in question and therefore a basis
for better mutual understanding between nations.
Economic Spillover Benefits
Related to the international prestige argument is the fact that a country’s historical artistic
patrimony may act as the ‘magnet’ that attracts tourists to a country.  Examples of this
abound, such as the Louvre in Paris, the Pyramids in Egypt, the Book of Kells in Trinity
College Dublin, the Zwinger in Dresden, and so on.  Tourists spend money and create major
employment.  Thus by protecting these national cultural assets everyone in the country, it is
argued, benefits.
It must be recognised of course that many other enterprises – such as golf or tennis clubs,
shopping facilities, commercial theatre or amusement parks – may have similar tourist and9
employment effects.  It could for example be claimed that good golfing facilities are a key
factor in attracting entrepreneurs to an area, with consequential benefits for museums.  As
such, it could be argued that the state should perhaps subsidise/own the golf clubs rather than
museums.  This example, while extreme, does illustrate the dangers of the economic spillover
argument.  Many people though probably believe that the Louvre for example creates benefits
for shops/restaurants in Paris and that the direction of causation is not the other way, and that
as such economic spillover effects do exist in relation to national cultural monuments.  The
primary rationale for public ownership of the Louvre though may never be related to such a
non-specific (to the arts) benefit, but these extra benefits may be important to an overall
assessment of public ownership of, and increased expenditure on, specific national cultural
monuments/artefacts.
Option Demand: for Future and Present Generations
The essence of the option-demand argument is that there is a benefit for present generations
involved in the consumption of the arts by future generations: present generations may derive
benefits from knowing that the historic cultural assets can be enjoyed by future generations.
In other words they are prepared to pay in taxes for these assets to be preserved even though
they derive no benefit themselves from the existence of such objects.. This argument is put
forcefully by Baumol and Bowen as follows.
We have all met people who admit they have never themselves learned to enjoy a particular
art form, but felt it important that such an opportunity be available to other members of
their families.  The same phenomenon has a significant extension to the posterity of the
community as a whole...
... A program to preserve the arts for the nation’s posterity is a case of indiscriminate
benefits par excellence.  No one can say whose descendants will profit one hundred years
hence from resources now devoted to that purpose.  Neither can these benefits be priced
and their cost covered by an admission charge.  (Baumol and Bowen, 1966, pp. 384-385)
.At first glance this is a convincing argument, but is it likely that people who put no direct
benefit whatsoever on the existence of such historical artefacts would be prepared to spend
money on such objects just in case their offspring might?  Put differently, is it likely that
someone who places no value on the contribution of historical art objects to the sense of
national belonging/identity would expect their offspring to do so?  It seems much more
convincing that if they place a high value themselves on national/regional identity they will10
pass on these values to their offspring and in this case would be very anxious to spend a little
more to make absolutely sure they continue to exist not just for their own lifetime but for
their offspring.
The cultural preservation case is related to another option demand argument.  People
derive benefit from knowing that the cultural facility exists, thereby allowing them the option
at some future date of attending it themselves, either on their own or with visitors.  It is
important to keep this argument separate from the other arguments.  People may want an art
treasure to ‘exist’, even though they never wish to see it, for reasons other than option
demand: thus option-demand value is simply a small subset of the existence-value argument.
The national identity argument is another, and again a much more important part of the
argument;  few Germans for example may pay to see a Dürer painting but many want it to be
kept because of its contribution to national identity.  Option demand arguments apply to
almost all goods and services: we all like to know there is a quality restaurant or specialist
shop or tennis club in our area, if only to know that one day we, or our children or our
visitors, might like to use them.  But is this an argument for providing public subsidy to a
restaurant, or specialist shop, or a tennis club?
III    Fair Prices and Distributional Considerations
It is possible that large collective benefits are associated with the existence in the country
of certain historical art objects but which the country still cannot afford to buy, at least not in
relation to what some person/institution in another country is prepared to pay.  Concern over
the need to restrict the movement of art has mainly come about, in some people’s opinion,
not because of an anti-trade mentality but rather due to such distributional concerns.  With
the tendency for art to move from rich to poor countries there are fears that all art will end up
within a few wealthy nations and the rest of the world my be left culturally impoverished.
This though is part of a more general concern with the distribution of wealth both within and
between countries.  Most material wealth such as real estate and automobiles  is concentrated
in the hands of the top 10 per cent of the world’s earners, largely in America, Europe and
Japan, so what is different if this is also the case with historical artefacts?  As argued already,
historical artefacts may be very different to automobiles, houses, TV and other material
goods.  A country cannot sell some parts of its wealth as a result if its very ‘being’ is
threatened.  Thus access to air and water, access to ones children, and so on are qualitatively
different to most material goods and are not for ‘sale’.  Likewise many people will not
renounce their religion regardless of the material cost and history is replete with examples of
this.  Historical artefacts many people argue belong much closer to the ‘religion’ category11
than to the ‘cars/TV’ grouping and as such do not have a price in the normal sense of the
word: in other words certain things some people argue should not be for sale, no matter what
the price.
4
Bator (1981) describes art as a form of national capital as it generates income (for
example through tourism as seen) and also as it produces psychological and social benefits
for a country’s citizens.  Using this perspective however he argues does not imply that in
preserving the national patrimony that no national art should be sold and/or exported.  If the
price obtainable for sale/export exceeds the ‘fair’ value of a work (including its non-monetary
value) then the nation’s wealth is intact or enhanced and there is no loss in selling it.  Surely,
cultural capital is just like any other capital; if someone wants to buy it at fair price let them
do so.
This of course must apply to that part of the cultural capital that is not collectively
owned, such as paintings in private hands, churches or private art museums.  In this case, a
fair price must be paid, or else there is interference with the private property rights of an
individual.  Indeed, it might be asked how an artefact is part of the national patrimony
anyway if it is in private hands.  It could be if it once belonged in a public place or public
ownership or people are otherwise familiar with or attached to it.  If it is, then the issue really
is that the state/some collective domestic source should have right of ‘first refusal’ should it
come up for sale.  There may though be a feeling that since these historic artefacts are owned
by wealthy people perhaps they ‘should’ pay back the country that made such wealth creation
possible by donating, at a lower price, the artefact in question.  In a sense this situation
applies in the United States where there is an expectation that wealthy individuals, aided by
tax concessions, will donate to worthy causes, including the donation of their works of art, in
recognition of the fact that it was the market economic system of that country that made such
wealth collection possible in the first place (see Useem and xxx).
If the artefact is in collective ownership the issue then arises as to when if ever it should
be sold.  Klamer (1996) discusses the hypothetical case of the Chinese wishing to buy
Rembrandt’s Nightwatch from the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam for say $1 billion.  Would it
be sold for this extraordinary price and if not is there any price at which it would be sold?
Klamer (p. 46) argues:
Because of the identification of the Dutch with the painting, it cannot be sold.  Time is
involved as well as bonding.  Some ‘products’ need time; people have invested in them,
and once they begin to bear fruit – in the form of feelings of love, pride, awe even –
giving them up is inconceivable; selling our friendship would be a betrayal of all we stand12
for.  Another factor is uncertainty.  We can never be sure of the value of those special
products.  How much is your child worth to you?  How much do you want for your
wedding ring?  Is a Nightwatch worth 100 million dollars, or 1 billion?  If we have to
exchange what is precious to us, we may prefer to do so in a deal involving some form of
reciprocity.  So we might lend out the Nightwatch – but only if the Chinese were to return
the favour somehow, royally, at a  later date.  That way we may discover value in the deal
itself, that is, in the quality of the reciprocal exchange.
This quotation captures a number of things pertinent to the discussion.  First, there is the
point that all goods/services as mentioned earlier are not the same, and that certain things
quite literally do not have a price for most people.  The example of one’s child is a good
illustration of this.  Historical artefacts for many people may belong to this group.  Second, it
is clear that many of the important things to a person in their daily lives are not bought in the
market place but received through reciprocal exchange between family members, work
colleagues and friends.  Third, the point about ascertaining the value, or price at which one
would be willing to sell at, takes considerable time for some objects, especially say family
heirlooms or national historical artefacts.  Last, the quotation raises the concept that over
time the utility derived from some objects can change, because of ‘bonding’.  This brings the
discussion back to the national identity argument discussed already; a feeling of
national/regional identity generated by art objects results in fact from such bonding.
The concept of bonding is related to the wider, so-called endowment effect (see Frey and
Pommerehne, 1989, and Thaler 1994); it relates to the phenomenon that people often demand
much more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it.  The reason is
that in the case of artefacts such as paintings the nature of the service derived from the good
changes with possession.  For example, a thing which you or a nation enjoyed as your own
for a long time, such as a painting, takes ‘root in your being and cannot be torn away without
your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it’ (Supreme
Court Justice, quoted in Thaler, 1994, p. 76).  Thus there is not only the pleasure of looking
at the painting but the psychic benefits associated with past  ‘consumption’ of the painting.
These psychic benefits do not exist at the point of purchase but build up over time, implying
that what you would therefore be prepared to sell the painting for would be considerably
higher than what you originally paid for (even adjusting fully for inflation and other factors).
This has important implications for the market in historical artefacts.  It implies that in
relation to these goods there is a status quo bias, that is a preference for the current state
which biases the person/nation against selling.  This would suggest then that not enough such13
objects will enter the market, be it the domestic or international market.  As such, there
should be no need to put restrictions on the sale of these in the market place.
But, according to the earlier argument, some goods do not have a price.  This is simply
stating that the psychic benefits that result from the ‘bonding’ associated with some historical
artefacts have a value that approaches infinity.  But who is to be the judge of this?  There are
two distinctly different cases here.
If the artefact is in private hands, then whether or not the artefact is sold, and at what
price, is up to the individual in question.  It may be that a nation has identified with this
artefact but it does not belong to the nation and the only way it can be obtained is by paying
the full market price.  It would run contrary to the principle of private property and individual
freedom to suggest otherwise.  The issue here then is how the nation is to obtain the object in
question, finance as always being a major factor.  Other devices are used and these will be
examined later in the paper.
The second case is where the object is already owned by the state but the question of
selling it to pay for other worthy projects such as hospitals arises.  There is an extraordinary
reluctance to sell works of art held in public collections/ownership.  As one author put it in
relation to the debate on international trade in art: ‘Paradoxically, it is easier for art works
that have been sold to leave the country altogether than for a work in a museum to be sold
and sent out of a state or city to another place within the United States’ (Zolberg, 1996, p.
171).  Even more paradoxically, it could be the reluctance to sell any art object, let alone
those belonging to the national patrimony, from national collections that is the greatest
barrier to others selling.
5  Once the object is sold to such a collection it can in effect never be
bought back; once sold it is truly gone for ever.  Thus, it does not make sense to exhort a
country/person to sell an artefact now and buy it back if times get better; such a choice may
not exist.  In this sense it is much better if the objects are sold to private collectors, since it is
much more likely that they will come on the market again than if they are purchased by a
museum.  On the other hand though, if an object is sold out of public ownership in one
country to public ownership in another at least residents of the selling country can have
access to the object if they should visit the buying country.  For many people this is poor
compensation, as the location in which the object is placed may be vital to the overall psychic
benefits that flow from the artefact; there is also of course the cost of getting to the other
country.  Long-term loans or in some cases ‘permanent loans’ may be a way of overcoming
this problem, but it is not evident why this should be the case if the loan is truly permanent.14
 IV   Restricting Objects In The National Patrimony Leaving A Country
 A : Introduction
Almost all of the policy discussion in relation to the national patrimony relates not so much to
what it is and why it needs protection, nor to how the state might purchase relevant objects
once they are identified as belonging to the national patrimony, but to how objects held in
private hands but deemed as belonging to the national patrimony can be kept within the
boundaries of the nation state in question.  It does not matter whether such an object should
be sold to another private individual within that country.  Nor is there concern that the part of
the national patrimony held in public collections be sold as this will almost certainly not arise,
for reasons mentioned earlier.  Rather, the emphasis is almost exclusively on preventing
works from being exported.
It is true that most governments use various devices, such as tax breaks, to entice
individuals to leave works of art to art museums and thereby keep the works of art in
question in the country.  These tax breaks however apply not only to works of art but all
donations to non-profit organisations, including those to churches, schools, hospitals, and
other art forms such as concert halls, opera, theatre, and so on.  Besides, in relation to works
of art they are not restricted usually to works of art belonging to the national patrimony; they
apply to all works of art, be they new or old, ‘good’ or ‘bad’.  There are reasons for the state
to subsidise in this way donations of works of art not belonging to the national patrimony
(see O’Hagan, 1998) but these are not of direct relevance to this discussion.  Some
governments though do use the tax system to entice people to keep objects belonging to the
national patrimony (mainly the UK) but these are relatively unimportant devices when
compared with export regulations and direct purchase by the state.  It is also the case that
some art work purchased today will at some later stage, because of the bonding discussed
earlier, become part of the national patrimony; thus, unless there is state purchase of more
recent art there will be no part of the future national patrimony relating to more recent times.
This section will consider three devices by which states attempt to keep objects belonging
to the national patrimony within national boundaries: export restrictions and pre-emptive
rights, import regulations/restrictions, and tax breaks specific to the national patrimony. 
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B: Export Restrictions and Pre-emptive Rights
The most common form of regulation in art markets, in place in over 140 countries, with the
notable exception of the US, is restrictions on exports of art objects belonging to the national
patrimony.  Legislation in this area concerns limiting, controlling or prohibiting the export of15
works of art through subjecting them to approval or notification systems prior to export.
Most countries try to limit the number of items subject to restrictions by criteria of age and/or
value to ensure they are practical to enforce (this list may be different to what is listed in the
national patrimony or may act as a proxy for what is in the national patrimony where no such
list exists), but there is a wide variety in degree of controls between nations.  The main
methods of export regulation  that are in use or that have been proposed are the following:
1. Embargo or Prohibition.  The prohibition on export may refer either to an entire class of
items such as all antiquities or some precisely defined list of works.  The effect of
embargo is to eliminate all legal trade in listed items and as such is often applied only to a
limited number of art works.  Also countries using embargo will generally allow certain
exceptions.  For example China prohibits the export of all works of art except for the
purpose of exhibition subject to the issuance of a special licence.
7  Countries such as
Columbia and Turkey also enforce prohibition of exports unless for temporary exchange
or exhibition.  Prohibition can only be useful for countries with strict border controls and
low international trade as export bans raise the value of art on illegal markets encouraging
smuggling and illicit export (see later).
2. Export Quotas.  This system sets export quotas by reference to the volume of imports.  It
was suggested by the UK Waverly Committee to try to keep a balance between the gains
to the national patrimony from imports with losses through exports but was rejected and
is not currently in use in any state.
8
3. Export Licensing.  This is the most flexible and widely-used instrument for export control
with a variety of systems in place ranging from genuine screening devices to effective
embargo in that licences are rarely granted ( ‘administratively enforced embargo’ (see
Bator 1981)).  Liberal systems include that of Japan in which the list of items requiring a
licence is very narrowly defined or the UK which maintains high age and value criteria.
Strict systems are found in countries such as Italy and Greece in which any item deemed
of subjective interest by the state requires licence authorisation.
4. Pre-emptive Rights.  These are associated with export licensing. They give the state,
public museums or other institutions the right to purchase the work of art to be exported
at either a competitive market price or one set or agreed through negotiation. Licence
application is needed to defer export and allows time for potential domestic purchasers to
mobilise the necessary funds; this is important also as seen earlier as it can often take
considerable time and reflection to ascertain the extent of the ‘bonding’ and therefore
psychic collective benefit that may attach to a historical artefact.  National systems vary16
as to whether the price offered by the exporter has to be matched, or a new price
negotiated or settled by the courts.  Some states such as Italy and Greece retain the right
to withhold the licence even when the delay period is due and no offer is forthcoming; this
is equivalent to export prohibition.  Others such as France retain this right but offer
compensation to the owner.  In states such as the UK and Canada however  export
licences must be granted if the state or domestic institution does not exercise their rights
of acquisition.
5.  Export Taxes.  Some states also impose taxes once an export licence is granted to act as
a further disincentive to export.  Taxes are based on the value of the object to be
exported and vary  from 5 to 30 per cent in Italy and Spain and in the 15-25  per cent
range in Saudi Arabia. Internally in the EU taxes are not permitted as they  were found to
be contrary to Article 16 of the Treaty of Rome concerning the abolition of customs
duties.
9
It is obvious that nations differ significantly in the intentions and practices of their export
regulation systems.  Thus, the fact that one country has a particularly strict regime on its
statute books does not mean that de facto such a system applies.  Nonetheless, the table
below does gives an indication of how a sample of countries rank against each other,
probably both de jure and de facto, in severity of restrictions.
Table 1 shows the US has one of the most liberal systems with no legislation barring or
limiting the export of art, except  very specific laws protecting Indian sacred sites.  This  lack
of restrictions could be due both to the predominance of a free market ideology in the US
economic system and  the fact that they are and always have been predominantly buyers
rather than sellers of art. It is also worth noting that all of the major international art markets
lie towards the top of the table (London for old masters, New York for contemporary art,
Switzerland for jewellery and antiques, and so on.).  Further, it is clear that a country not rich
in national patrimony will resist efforts to impose any system of uniform export restrictions.
Besides, there may be economic, and as well cultural, factors that explain a particular
country’s attitude to export restrictions.  This will also apply in relation to how a country will
assist in enforcing an export regulation applicable in another country.
C : Import Regulations
The  use of export regulations is, as seen, only one of a range of instruments used to protect
the national patrimony by keeping it within the boundaries of the country in question. For a
system of control to function properly, import regulations are perhaps a necessary corollary17
which implies that states have to rely on the co-operation of other nations – the ultimate
consumers of exported art.  Import regulations in other cultural goods often relate to
protective measures
10, but in the case of art are in place to try to reduce illicit trade by
making those who provide a potential market agree not to purchase  works they believe are
stolen or in breach of some export regulation. Generally this implies that all imports must be
accompanied by some form of pedigree such as proof of origin, ownership, or  legal export.
  Again there are a variety of systems in place.  The US is the most significant importing state
as well as the largest market for stolen and illegally exported art.  Its policy on imports is as
liberal as that of exports with no restrictions on imports apart from some pre-Columbian
sculptures and murals. The UK, another important collecting and exporting nation, also does
not impose controls on imports or recognise and enforce the export controls of other states
claiming it would work against their status as a major international market.  These and other
wealthy art markets such as Japan are all major importers and, to maximise the range of
acquisitions available, generally are against import controls.  While they can be forced to deal
legally with issues of stolen property, illegal export does not often in itself constitute an
offence.  Other states have a variety of measures in place which can be categorised as
follows:
1. Blank Check Control.  This refers to systems which bar the import of all art whose export
has not been legally authorised.  Proponents of this system claim that the US and other big
importers are major markets for illegally-exported art and, as they are economically superior
to art rich states, there is a strong incentive to sell to them even if in violation of export laws.
As a result, the blank check control system was proposed in the original draft of the
UNESCO Convention Document 
11 which called for all signatories to prohibit import of
works of art unless accompanied by appropriate export documentation from their country of
origin.  The US rejected and defeated this draft stating that they could not adopt a rule
banning imports simply because their export was in violation of another state’s law.
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2.  Selective Controls or Import Limitations.  While few nations prohibit the import of art,
many apply selective restraints.  Types of art imports subject to restraint are:
a) Stolen works of art ( stolen from their state of origin and therefore not declared as part of
their exports);
b) Illegally exported objects ( exported in violation of the state-of-origin laws);
c) Objects from clandestinely excavated sites (the most difficult to prove as theft unless
initially classified and protected under the state’s law).18
In the case of stolen art most states, including the US, provide remedies in the form of
judicial action giving the owner  rights to sue for recovery in the courts of the importing
nation provided  they can furnish sufficient proof of ownership and theft. The second type,
(b), is not as clear-cut as the complaining party for this case is the state whose export laws
have been violated, rather than the original owner seeking return.  As a general rule exporting
states will have no standing in the importing state to recover the stolen object or sue for its
value and must seek remedy directly against those who violated its laws.  A problem that
arises in legal cases in this area, and that of the third category, is the difficulty in
distinguishing between stolen and illegally exported goods.
13  For example in the famous US
v McClain  (1977) case (see McAlee?) where Mexican artefacts were being looted from sites
and illegally exported to the US, the necessity of establishing ownership was emphasised.
Many pieces involved were not known or registered with the Mexican government and so the
courts ruled that while it was illegal to deal in stolen goods, theft could not be established
unless there was a bona fide declaration of ownership.  Illegal export in itself does not
constitute theft and as such it is not a violation to import an item of art or anything else into
the US just because it has been illegally exported from another state.
14
3. Self Restraining Acquisition Policies.  Rather than resorting to judicial action this system
involves those supplying the market for illegally exported goods to voluntarily decline
purchase.  Works of art of national importance will often end up in museums, and, through
international pressure and self interest in preserving art, most of these institutions have
developed ‘ethical acquisition’ policies.  Most large museums have explicit policy statements
regarding acquisitions which generally include that works will not be accepted into
collections if illegal export is suspected or until some valid title can be proven.  International
organisations such as ICOM and UNESCO have been instrumental in developing ethical
acquisition codes and policies that they expect their members to comply with. ICOM,
founded in Paris in 1946 and now with around 15,000 members in 147 countries, also has a
code of professional ethics, respect for which is regarded as a minimum requirement to
practice as a member of the museum profession.  It states explicitly that:
Illicit trade in objects destined for public and private collections encourages the
destruction of historic sites...theft at both national and international levels... and
contravenes the spirit of national and international patrimony...A museum should not
acquire, whether by purchase, gift, bequest or exchange, any object unless the governing
body and responsible officer are satisfied that the museum can acquire a valid title to the
specimen or object in question and that in particular it has not been acquired in, or19
exported from its country of origin and or any intermediate country in which it may have
been legally owned in violation of that country’s laws... (ICOM, 1986, p.)
 15
 Although not all museums enforce such policies (and there is no way to control the
acquisitions of private/individual collectors),
16 media attention concerning acquisition
controversies and substantial public interest especially from potential donors has exerted
considerable pressure on large institutions to refrain from dealing in unlawfully traded
material.  However Hamilton (1975) describes the problems of  these self regulating policies
in an analogy to a strike:
Self denying ordinances are a tactic similar to a working man’s strike: unless a sizeable
majority join in the tactic, it will fail and the striker will be out of work, the museum
poorer in collections.  On the other hand, if the evil is perceived by large enough numbers
of the public, government regulation could be imposed – if museums fail to stem the tide
of criticisms by their own acts, legislators may take the initiative away from them...
(Hamilton, 1975, p. 361)
Many regulators feel legal restrictions on what museums obtain is overly  rigid and  puts
acquisition policies in the hands of  public officials rather than the museums themselves. Most
nations use some form of indirect regulation via tax and other financial incentives. Museums
often receive favourable tax treatment due either to their status as charities (e.g. US) or as
public storehouses of the nation’s wealth in art. These tax incentives could be the entry point
for regulating museum acquisitions with favourable treatment made conditional on the
adoption of suitable policies.
17
There is substantial international agreement in imposing import controls if the art is
stolen, or its illicit export is damaging an important category of art or a nation’s legitimate
national patrimony.  However many feel that unless there is a multilateral system operating,
illegal flows of art will continue in the direction towards the countries with the least controls.
D: Tax Policies and Incentives
Tax incentives are used by most governments as a means to support the arts.  In relation to
the national patrimony, financial incentives are used as a form of indirect aid, channelling
funds and donations towards art institutions and thus encouraging the domestic retention of
works of art and reducing trade. Incentives may be designed to discourage exports of
heritage art through encouraging donations to domestic museums in cash or kind
18 or through20
making it more financially attractive to hold the object rather than sell it abroad.  Finally, tax
breaks may also be offered in return for public access and ownership by domestic institutions.
Tax  incentives are generally applied to receipt of income or transfer of works of art by sale,
gift or death (see Christies, 1998, for details on the various tax measures available in different
countries).
These tax measures though are not, as mentioned already, specific to the national
patrimony and only aid the retention of art-historical objects indirectly.  Nonetheless, there
are a few tax measures which specifically apply to the national patrimony and two of these
will be discussed briefly.
Exemptions from inheritance and capital taxes.  Works of art may be exempt from these
taxes once certain conditions concerning public access or exhibition and retention within the
state are met.  There are 100 per cent exemptions from inheritance, estate and capital gains
tax for donations of art to national museums and galleries in countries such as the UK and
Japan.
If the object is kept in private hands, then in the UK tax concessions also apply and the
scheme is known as a 'conditional exemption' because, to avail of the tax break, certain
conditions must be fulfilled, namely: the work must be considered by the state to be of
national artistic, historic or scientific interest;
19 it must be deemed of sufficiently high quality
to be displayed in a public collection or be 'museum worthy'; the owner must agree to keep
the object permanently in the UK (a change in 1998?); plus agree to take  steps to preserve
and maintain the object and ensure reasonable public access either through allowing access in
situ in private homes or through loan to a public institution for exhibition for at least 28 days
per year. Other countries attach value limits such as in Germany where exemptions are
granted up to amounts of 40,000 DM for direct inheritants or 10,000 DM for others.  In all
schemes these tax incentives promote the dual objectives of discouraging export and
increasing public access.
Acceptance in lieu is an incentive that allows individuals to discharge a tax debt on asset
and estate taxes by donating works of art to the state and public institutions.  This
mechanism acts as a tax deduction and there are usually stipulations attached in terms of
acceptability of items and if remaining in situ, public loan and exhibition conditions.  For
example, in the UK, to be considered items must be both museum worthy and 'pre-eminent' in
their own right or as an addition to a collection, or in Germany the work must be 'exceptional'
and represent the public interest.
20  Governments are often strict as to which items are
acceptable in lieu of taxes as this tax incentive is more costly than others in that the tax
usually paid on transfer is lost plus the tax deduction from estate or other taxes owed.  Again21
like the previous incentive, acceptance in lieu is in place to discourage exports and increase
public access.
 V    Conclusions
It is clear that for most states there are objects which form a special part of the county’s
cultural/historical legacy, some works of art very much falling into this category.  A corollary
of this appears to be that the objects in question should remain within the geographic
boundaries of the state/region concerned, for reasons mentioned earlier; the fact that the
object would be maintained and conserved somewhere abroad appears not to be relevant to
this debate.  It was argued that if this is the case the most appropriate avenue to ensure the
maintenance of such objects in the country is through state purchase; if they belong in some
sense to ‘all’ then they should be paid for and owned by all, through the state purchasing and
maintaining them.  This is indeed the case for most such objects and in most countries what
would be considered as part of the national patrimony is largely on display in public
museums.  The argument for such public ownership has been examined carefully in this
article; the principle of the argument is not really challenged, but the extent to which it applies
is a matter of considerable debate.  How many objects ‘belong to all’, in the sense that they
confer a benefit on a wide section of the population, and how much society should pay to
obtain these objects are all matters of heated debate.
There are objects though which many consider to be part of the national patrimony but
which are not in state ownership.  Examples of these include private collections of historical
artefacts, objects kept in churches, and objects the ownership of which is unclear, such as yet
undiscovered art treasures.  Once these objects remain in the state there does not appear to
be an issue, even though there may be no public access to many of these objects.  Why
though should this be the case and why does it only become an issue when the objects come
up for sale?  It would presumably be difficult to raise the issue otherwise as compulsory
purchase by the state is not an option when they are not for sale.  Besides, once they are
declared for sale there is a very real possibility they will be sold abroad, given that the market
for art is very much global in nature and as such any individual country would normally form
only a small part of the purchasing power within that market.  The question then is why can
the state or some public institution not simply compete on this global market and buy the
objects on the open market?  The alternative is to prevent in some way the sale abroad of
these objects.22
Export licences in many cases simply ‘provide time’ for a public institution to compete on
the open market.  The object could for example otherwise be sold without their knowledge.
Besides, it usually takes much more time for a public institution to raise the money for such a
purchase than would be the case for example for some foreign private institution.  This would
be especially the case if the public institution requires both private and public contributions to
raise the necessary funding.  The provision of this ‘time’ therefore seems reasonable provided
that the time period is not excessive and once elapsed the individual is free to sell to the
highest bidder.
If this is not the case and the individual is not allowed to sell abroad, even after the elapse
of a year say, then for some this is acceptable.  The cost for the individual is of course a
considerably lower price received; if sold on the much smaller domestic market then a lower
price is almost inevitable.  The alternative for the individual is to sell it illegally abroad;
because of the potentially large differential between domestic and global price there will be
plenty of economic incentive to do so.  But which is more inappropriate, the sale abroad with
the full permission of the owner but not that of the state or the sale on the domestic market
with the state’s consent but with the owner constrained to do so and receiving probably a
much lower price?  This is the central issue in placing any constraint on the sale of works of
art other than that of a ‘delaying’ export licence.  For many people it may be an acceptable
constraint on private ownership/sale.  Such restrictions exist in all societies; for example
individuals cannot legally sell hard drugs in most western societies, exchange and capital
controls have operated in many developed countries and in times of crisis restrictions on
private actions can be far-reaching.  As mentioned previously, some people see works of
historical art as belonging outside the normal range of trade/commerce, no matter who owns
it.  Besides, reinforcing this is the fact that most works of historical artefacts are probably
owned by wealthy people, people who as mentioned may have made their wealth in that
country and who many believe should make an appropriate return to the nation by either
retaining historical art objects within the country or by donating them to the state, with or
without state assistance.  For others though the strong belief persists that such philanthropic
gestures should be voluntary and not enforced through some state regulation/action; the next
step could be enforced ‘appropriation’ of all art objects held by wealthy individuals without
any compensation whatsoever.  For those who believe that the existence of private property
and its protection under the law is a sine qua non of an economically strong and civilised
society this would be intolerable.23
Endnotes
1 According to US government sources, around 220,000 works were seized, or forcibly sold, to the
Nazis.  An indication of the vast scale of this is that these paintings represent about a fifth of the
world’s total stock of western art, equivalent to around $25 billion at today’s prices.  Half of these
works of art are still missing or the subject of dispute.  (See, ‘On the Track of Art with a Troubled
History’, Financial Times, November 21, 1999.
2 A related issue is that the viewing of an artifact such as a painting can provide a service to more than
its owner and at no extra cost.  Thus many people can view a painting and derive pleasure from this
without reducing anyone else’s pleasure.  This is also a situation where state ownership would be
justified, especially if the numbers wanting to see/visit the artifact was large.
3 ‘They Loot Graves Don’t They?’, Economist,  January 16 1999.
4 A typical example of such a view would be the following.  ‘To attempt an estimate of the money
value of the artistic content of our museums would be an intellectual vulgarism... (art) is a service to
society as free from the rules of demand and supply as the service of law’ (Adams, 1937, p. 47).
5 A further factor of course is the high cost of selling works of art, with commissions for selling
averaging around 10 per cent or more of the selling price.
6 A particular problem in looking at this issue is that many measures put in place are designed to
guard against trade in stolen art historical objects; this is a rather different form of illegality to art that
is traded with the knowledge and support of its owner but which is in violation of some export
restriction.  There is fairly widespread agreement across countries that some form of international
treaty is needed to deal with art objects which are stolen, but even here there is considerable difficulty
as very often the question of ownership is in dispute or unclear.  Related to this is the question of art
historical objects which had been stolen/looted some time in the past (e.g. such as during the Second
World War) by invading/occupying armies and whose ownership is now very much in dispute.  The
concern here is exclusively with the measures put in place to deal with trade in art historical objects
which is in breach of the laws restricting such trade; the problem as shall be seen is that in many cases
such measures are designed to deal with both issues, i.e. stolen and illegally-exported objects.  This
though does not apply to measures to restrict exports and these will form the main focus of the
remainder of this paper.
7 Although nothing has been given exception since 1950.
8 Prott and O’ Keefe’s (1989) explanation for its rejection was that as most movement involved
outward flows, a balanced quota was little different to a prohibition of exports.
9 The case of EC Commission v. Italy  (1968) is detailed in Prott and O’Keefe (1989) in which Italy’s
progressive tax on art exports of  8-30% was found to be contrary to the principles of the Treaty Of
Rome. Italy had argued that the tax did not unduly hamper trade and helped to compensate the nation
for the loss of its national patrimony by providing funds to use for preservation and restoration but
were defeated and Italian law was changed in 1972 to remove the tax.
10 It is argued that import restrictions are needed in certain cultural industries to prevent indigenous
cultures from being bombarded with some dominant external culture. For example content restrictions
on TV programming in France or content quotas in Canada’s radio stations to prevent US domination
(see Kesten, 1992).  It should also be noted that certain nations may actively encourage imports (e.g.
exemptions from tariffs and customs duties) to foster cultural awareness and education or simply to
allow for more  trade on their national markets.
11 See section 2.4
12 Bator (1981) argues on the side of the US regarding the undesirability of such a rule. He claims that
it removes the decision as to what art enters a country and the decision of what scope of enforcement
regime it may be practical and desirable to operate. Blank Check Systems imply that you must enforce
other states export laws whatever their content even if highly restrictive and coercive which must
always work in the direction of restricting the international trade in art despite the wishes of the
international community. It would also involve a very complex, expensive and intrusive regime to be
effectively enforced especially in the EU where all other interests have moved towards dismantling
border controls.
13 For details on the substantial numbers of legal cases tried in this area see Merryman and Elsen
(1979) and  Prott and O’Keefe (1989).24
14 For a more in depth discussion of the case see McAlee (1981) and Bator (1981).The case stirred
debate over the need for blanket state ownership of sites  as the courts  ruling held that an antiquity
could be regarded as stolen property under the National Stolen Property act if it was taken from a
foreign state that had explicitly declared ownership.  However Bator’s discussion of the case makes
the point that this might encourage a regulatory regime that is over inclusive and unduly rigid. He
states that many illegally exported antiques were unearthed years ago and often are substantially
unwanted at home and unnecessary to preserve the national patrimony.  He claims that nominal state
ownership should not prevent their free export and the  stolen property category should be reserved for
clear and egregious cases .
15See Article 3.2 in ICOM Code of Professional Ethics at http:// www.icom.org/
16 According to O’Keefe (1997) there is only one association of private collectors – the Swiss
Association of  Collectors and it has no code of conduct
17 In the EU  the 7
th directive did not affect the exemption from VAT for museum imports .
Exemptions such as these provide an example of such an ‘entry point’ to regulate acquisitions, for
example if imports are not accompanied by suitable pedigree or proof of ownership/legal export.
18  Again, encouraging museum ownership is analogous to discouraging exports especially in
European institutions who rarely if ever sell any works that become part of their collections
19 Specifically objects eligible for conditional exemption are : any pictures, prints, books, manuscripts,
works of art, scientific collections or other things not yielding income which appear to the
commissioner of the Inland Revenue to be of national, scientific or artistic interest (British Inland
Revenue,1986)
 
20  In certain states such as Belgium whilst acceptance in lieu is possible in theory, conditions for
approval are so strict- needing international recognition and depending on the successor- that the




Table 1: Ranking of Countries in Terms of Severity of Export Restrictions
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minimal or Low level High level Export embargo
 no restrictions
Barbados Japan       France      China
United States Switzerland          Italy      Columbia
UK          Spain      Turkey
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------25
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